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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
RIGHTS OF A MORTGAGEE AND CREDITORS
UNDER MISSOURI LAW WHEN THE MORT-
GAGOR RETAINS POSSESSION.
There are remedies open to the mortgagee, both in law and in
equity, that will allow him to recover against his mortgagor who re-
mains in possession of the property. But his remedy in a law court is
generally ineffectual in whole or in part. He cannot, of course, bring
replevin or trover, because he has never had possession of the property.
And an action for damages, which is always open to him, is often not
efficacious; for, in the majority of cases, the mortgagor is insolvent,
so that damages, although in theory recoverable could not be actually
obtained. His remedy in equity is a surer remedy. The basis of his
claim there, whether it is considered as a right to demand specific per-
formance of the agreement, or as an equitable lien on the mortgaged
property, will bring about the same practical results.
When the mortgagee allows the mortgagor to retain possession
of the property he has the same rights against his mortgagor as he
would have if he had taken possession. If the mortgagee is specifically
designated, has given a valuable consideration and has not used fraud
or misrepresentation in procuring the mortgage, he has an equitable
lien which he can enforce against the mortgagee. And his rights are
in no sense impaired because he allows the mortgagor to retain the
property and deal with it in any way he chooses.
But as soon as the rights of a third person are introduced the sit-
uation is changed.1 The cases generally arise when the mortgagor is
insolvent and therefore unable to meet the claims set forth by the
such a situation both the mortgagee and the third party have just but
conflicting rights, and these cases are always difficult of equitable
solution. When the third party is a purchaser for value there is no
difficulty; such a person gets title to the property upon payment of
consideration and the mortgagee cannot divest him of it because of
any claim that he may have to the property. But in the case of a mort-
gagee and one extending credit who shall suffer: the mortgagee who
has advanced money on the basis of his security, or the creditor who
has extended credit in the belief that the property held by the vendee
was free from incumbrance? To force the mortgagee to take posses-
sion of the property or lose his lien would greatly interfere with trade,
for in many cases (as, for instance, the mortgaging of a stock in trade).
1. Embree vs. Roney, 152 Mo. App. 257.
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Such a taking of possession would force the mortgagor to abandon all
business. On the other hand, to give the mortgagee entire preference
would undermine the credit system.
The states have attempted to meet this conflict by passing statutes
requiring mortgages to be recorded. Such statutes in regard to per-
sonal property cannot, in the very nature of things, be as effective as
are analogous statutes in regard to real estate. In the first place,
transactions involving real property are relatively few and involve
larger sums of money; therefore time expended in searching the rec-
ords is well spent. In the case of personal property this is not true.
Secondly, land is fixed, while personalty may be taken from one place
to another. Furthermore, the mortgagor himself may be in one state
one year and another the next. Therefore, whether the statutes re-
quire recording in the place where the property is situated or where
the mortgagor resides when the transaction takes place, the prospective
vendor cannot be certain that there is no lien on the property, even
when he takes the time and trouble to look up the records. Some
states have further narrowed the risk of subsequent vendors by re-
quiring the mortgage to be recorded anew each year, but Missouri has
not gone so far. The Missouri statute simply requires an original
recording of the chattel mortgage in the county where the mortgagor
is domiciled, unless there is a taking of possession by the mortgagee.2
If the mortgagor lives outside of the state, then the mortgage must be
recorded where the property is situated.3
By court decisions a reasonable time is given for the taking of
possession. This Missouri statute is based on a like statute of Massa-
chusetts, and the courts have adopted the Massachusetts line of de-
cisions under their statute. It would seem that the only logical reason
for requiring the recording of chattel mortgages would be to give
notice to prospective creditors of the prior incumbrance so that credit-
ors without actual information might acquire it through the medium
of the records. This view was strongly urged in the early cases,4
counsel basing their arguments on the analogous situation in regard
to realty, where actual notice is sufficient. But the courts, adopting the
stricter interpretation, decided that actual notice on the part of the
creditor cannot help the mortgagee who has neglected to record; that
is to say, recording is a condition precedent to the validity of the
mortgage and that actual notice cannot cure the defect as to third
2. Mo. R. S. 1919, Sec. 2256.
3. Ibid.
4. Shepherd vs. Trigg, 7 Mo. 151; Bryson vs. Penix, 18 Mo. 13.
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parties, even when the latter were in no sense misled in extending
credit.5 It is easy to see how, on a purely logical and technical basis,
these decisions are sound; for the statute declares these unrecorded
mortgages to be "void" as to third parties and does not except those
cases in which the creditors have actual notice. But the results seem
inequitable. Since no one has been misled, the loss of the mortgagee's
lien would seem to be more or less in the nature of punishment-and
a rather heavy punishment at that-for failure to record. Such a line
of decisions would also seem rather to open the way for fraud and
injustice than to prevent them.
It has been held in Missouri by a long line of decisions that the
mere retention of possession by the mortgagor does not render the
mortgage void.8 But if the mortgagor has the power of sale over these
goods without being liable to account for the proceeds, then the mort-
gage is void as to third persons on the grounds of its being a fraudt-
lent conveyance. However, a mere power of sale will not render the
mortgage void if there is a provision for an accounting. There is also
a distinction drawn between an instrument void on its face and one that
can be shown to be void in fact. Thus a mortgage which provides that
the mortgagor shall retain possession of the property, "with full rig'hts
of enioyment," was held to be void on its face as to attachinz credit-
ors : for the lan.ua.e of the very instrument itself showed that the
mortga.-or misyht deal with the nronertv with no supervision bv the
mortgag'ee and with no need of informinp, the latter of his dealings
therewith.$ But in order to he void on its face the instrument must,
exoressly or bv necessarv imnlication. vive the ripht of disnosition
without accounting. A provision that the mortpaor may from time
to time add, to the stock covered by the mortea-e does not of necessity
show that the mortpapor has the nower to sell and the court cannot
infer such a nower from this provision.'
But the fact that the mortoae is not fraudulent on its face does
not disnnse of all consideration by the court of fraud: the mortwave
may. still be fraudulent in fact if the morta ,or is allowed, contrary to
the mortoape. to deal with the goods as his own. just what amounts
to actual fraud is to be decided upon the facts of each senarate case
5. 1Rrvso" vQ. Penix, 18 Mo. 13: Bevtis vs. Bolton, 31 Mo. 437; Wilson
vs. Ml11raiv. 75 Mo. 41: Mart;-Perrin Mercantile Co. vs. Perkins, 63 Mo.
App. 310: Rawlings vs. Benn. 80 Mo. 614.
6. Tbrs has been 'held from the decision of Sibly vs. Hood, 3 Mo.
290, which ;nvolved the mortsaning of negroes, down to the present time.
7. Scudder vs. Bailey. 66 Mo. Apn. 40.
8. Independent Packing Co. vs. O'Keefe, 128 Mo. App. 592.
9. Voorhis vs. Langsdorf, 31 Mo. 451.
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as those facts are brought to light in the trial. For example, in the
case of McCarthy vs. Miller,10 a husband mortgaged a buggy and
certain horses to his wife, the mortgage providing that the husband
should have no power of sale without an accounting. The husband,
however, did exchange six of the horses, on one occasion retaining
$20.00 profit made on the exchange. This mortgage was held to be
void in fact. But in a later case this same court held that when a
mortgage covered a stock of goods and substitution was made in the
stock the mortgage was not thereby invalidated, even though one of
the partners (mortgagor was a partnership) withdrew certain funds
for his private use." It is hard to find a distinguishing element in these
two cases unless it be this-that in the later case there was a pro-
vision for regular monthly payments on the mortgaged debt which
would take this instrument out of the class of fraudulent conveyances.
However that may be, the theory at the basis of the case of Fleisher
Bros. v. Hinde seems to be a just one: that is, that the property
through substitution is kept within the reach of attaching creditors and
is for that reason no more fraudulent as to such creditors than would
be any other mortgage in which the mortgagor retains possession of
the property. Even the removal of the property from the state will not
invalidate the mortgage unless, of course, there is fraudulent conniv-
ance between the mortgagor and the mortgagee to the detriment of
creditors.'2
It has been shown that certain defects in a mortgage will render
it invalid as to third parties. Two additional questions present them-
selves: (1) Can the mortgagee cure such a defect and thereby make
his lien a valid one? (2) If he can, then as to what creditors will his
lien be paramount? There is no doubt as to the answer to the first
question-the morte-agee has an absolute right to perfect his mortgage
by curing the defect by recording or by taking possession of the prop-
erty. The answer to the second question is more complicated. As to
those who become creditors subsequent to the perfection of the mort-
gage the mortgagee will have a paramount lien.'3 But when anyone
has extended credit prior to the perfection of the mortgage the situa-
tion is changed. If the defect was merely formal and has not misled
creditors it may be remedied by changing the instrument and the
10. 41 Mo. App. 200.
11. Fleiqher Bros. vs. Hlinde. 122 Mo. App. 218.
12. McNichols vs. Fry, 62 Mo. App. 13.
13. Dobyns vs. Meyer. 95 Mo. 132; Bank vs. Powers, 134 Mo. 432;
Boland vs. Ross, 120 Mo. 208.
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mortgagee will get a paramount lien. 14 Such a situation would arise
where a corporation was mortgagee and the signatures of certain
officers were required, one of whom had neglected to sign. If the
mortgage is valid in all other respects his signature can be added,
and the mortgage lien will take preference over prior creditors. But
if the defect is a substantial one the reverse is true; the prior creditors
have a better claim to the property than the mortgagee. The reason
behind this seems to be that a fraud once committed cannot be cured
by a later action where the rights of third parties would be diminished
or taken away. And for this purpose "fraudulent acts" covers not
only those things done with actual fraudulent intent but also those
which from their tendency to deceive other persons would be as harm-
ful as if there was actual fraud.15 An example of the invalidity of
such reformation is the case of Landis v. McDonald."6 There it was
held that when a mortgage is unrecorded and debts are acquired by
the mortgagor in possession, the creditors cannot be defeated by the
subsequent taking of possession by the mortzagee but that the mort-
gage is fraudulent and void as to these creditors. To demand a para-
mount right such persons need not be soecific creditors; if they are
general creditors it is sufficient. They will have no rights against the
mortgagee until they have acquired a right by legal process; but this
right when acquired will relate back to the time when the debt was
incurred.17
Certain technicalities for making the mortgape valid have been
added by the passage of the Bulk Sales Act of 1913. This act covers
the "sale, trade or other disposition of the major part in value or the
whole of a stock of merchandise ,t.18 and requires the vendee,
at least seven days before the transaction, to get a complete list of the
names of creditors of the vendor together with the amount of the
indebtedness. These creditors must be notified by the vendee at least
seven days before the sale, either by telegraph or registered letter,
and failure to comply will render the transaction void as to these cred-
itors.1 9 This act covers the mortgaging of property,20 and if the mort-
gagee fails to comply therewith such a mortgage will be fraudulent
and void as to those who were creditors at the time the mortgage was
14. Center Creek Mininz Co., vs. Coyne, 164 Mo. App. 492.
15. Reed vs. Pelletier, 28 Mo. 173.
16. 88 Mo. App. 335.
17. Landis vs. McDonald. 88 Mo. App. 335.
18. Mo. R. S. 1919, Sec. 2286.
1.9. Ibid.
20. Semmes vs. Stecher Brewing Co., 195 Mo. App. 621.
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made.21 But by further provision of the act22 and by judicial decision
under the act,21 such a mortgagee will be entitled to be made receiver of
the mortgagor in regard to the property covered by the mortgage.
As has been shown the legislature has from time to time imposed
additional requirements on the mortgagee with which he must com-
ply in order to get a valid lien on the property. But in view of the
hardship on creditors that would exist if they were not protected in
this way, these restrictions seem to be justified and result in a more
equitable settlement of the conflicting rights of mortgagee and cred-
itors. LUCILLE STOCKE, '26.
21. Ibid.
22. Mo. R. S. 1919, Sec. 2287.
23. Semmes vs. Stecher Brewing Co., 195 Mo. App. 621.
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